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Abstract—The theft of medical data, which is intrinsically 
valuable, can lead to loss of patient privacy and trust. With increasing 
requirements for valuable and accurate information, patients need to 
be confident that their data is being stored safely and securely. 
However, medical devices are vulnerable to attacks from the digital 
domain, with many devices transmitting data unencrypted wirelessly 
to electronic patient record systems. As such, it is now becoming 
more necessary to visualise data patterns and trends in order identify 
erratic and anomalous data behaviours. In this paper, a system design 
for modelling data flow within healthcare infrastructures is presented. 
The system assists information security officers within healthcare 
organisations to improve the situational awareness of cyber security 
risks. In addition, a visualisation of TCP Socket Connections using 
real-world network data is put forward, in order to demonstrate the 
framework and present an analysis of potential risks. 
Keywords—Medical Device; Healthcare Infrastructures; Data 
Visualization; Cyber Security 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Hospital infrastructures are classified as mission-critical 
infrastructures [1]. Damage to network communications and 
the loss of patient data would have a detrimental impact on the 
healthcare services they provide. In addition, mobile devices 
are being increasingly deployed within their networks, in the 
form of applications ranging from biomonitoring to materials 
handling and transportation [2].  
Medical devices are instruments, appliances or software, 
which are used for the purpose of diagnosis, monitoring and 
treatment of disease or long term injury. They are essential for 
modern medicine and allow for automated patient monitoring 
and management functions [3]. These devices have become 
increasingly lightweight and ubiquitous in recent years. They 
are available for continuous use by patients and not restricted 
to use within clinical settings. Their interconnectedness is 
increasing both wired and wirelessly to external entities 
including the Internet, or local infrastructure-less wireless 
networks. These factors have the potential to make healthcare 
accessible to everyone and to reduce costs. However, they also 
provide potential for attackers to gain access to sensitive data 
for opportunistic purposes, such as for profit [4]. Implanted 
Medical Devices (IMDs) have become increasingly popular 
due to the precision control of dosage and the rapid access to 
data they provide to healthcare professionals [2].  
Security is crucial for the long term viability of all types of 
networked medical devices [5]. These devices have the 
potential to be tampered with, reprogrammed by unauthorized 
users or subject to device-specific hazards [5]. Devices can be 
targeted though their firmware upgrades or through 
connections to the network interface when connected through 
remote attacks, in addition to local attacks. For example, 
telemetry data of an implantable cardiac defibrillator could be 
reprogrammed remotely by researchers [6]. There are obvious 
physical hazards and privacy implications for these attacks. 
Security concerns for IMDs are particularly challenging due to 
the potential for patient injury or death due to adversarial 
tampering [2]. Additionally, the malfunctioning of high-profile 
medical devices results in potential loss of life due to network 
compromise or medical device tampering, in addition to the 
cost to the hospital in terms of brand damage due to loss of 
patient information and enforced regulations. 
This risk is further exacerbated by the Bring Your Own 
Devices (BYOD) revolution. This is a term referring to the 
technologies allowing employees to access and utilise internal 
corporate IT resources, with their personal devices [7]. BYOD 
policies have numerous benefits including reduced costs and 
improved productivity, convenience and efficiency of work. 
However, BYOD also carries numerous risks including data 
loss/leakage or theft, application security, network availability, 
legal liability and regulatory compliance and loss of brand 
identity [7]. Additionally, wireless connections on smart 
devices can be attacked more easily than on a desktop 
computer. The increasing number of phone operating systems 
and carrier combinations are invariably changing with 
technical advancements and becoming outdated quickly [7]. 
This poses various challenges for IT departments to support 
and secure.  
BYOD poses a particular risk to the healthcare network in 
that potentially insecure devices are granted access to hospital 
infrastructure and confidential data. An attacker can use this to 
their advantage by hacking a BYOD in order to gain back-door 
access onto a hospital network. For that reason, this paper 
presents a visualisation of real world hospital data, showing 
TCP socket connections to a server offering an Active 
Directory Domain Controller. The research involves analysing 
the number of differing devices connected to the network and 
points of vulnerability or entry for potential attackers.  
Specifically, in this paper, a system design for modelling 
data flow within healthcare infrastructures is presented. An 
illustration of the framework operation, using network TCP 
Socket Connections data of a Liverpool-based hospital, is 
employed as a case study. The system provides a real-time 
solution to analyse cyber-transactions and traffic. It assists 
information security officers within healthcare organisations to 
improve the situational awareness of cyber security risks. 
The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section II 
presents a literature review of the background research on 
industrial network, medical device security and visualization 
techniques. Section III outlines our system design. Section IV 
presents our results and a sample of test data. Section V 
discusses conclusions within the work and the future work to 
be done. 
II. BACKGROUND RESEARCH 
Medical device monitoring systems must be highly automated 
to reduce user involvement in deployment, operation and 
management [3]. A lack of security for healthcare devices 
could mean incorrect data being introduced or legitimate data 
being modified or suppressed by adversaries [5]. This may 
lead to both loss of patients’ privacy and potential physical 
harm to the patient. Many medical devices employ the use of 
wireless communication which technologies are intrinsically 
vulnerable and attacks can exploit this at patient side [3]. In 
this section, medical device security is discussed, along with 
the motivation and research problem being addressed. 
A. Medical Device Security 
For safety-critical Medical Cyber-Physical Systems 
(MCPSs), the ability to detect attackers, whilst limiting false 
alarms, is of critical importance [4]. Attackers who penetrate 
medical cyber-physical systems have the potential to cause 
harm to patients through reprogramming devices [8]. Currently 
typical known targets include the patient, the data, the device 
and the interaction between the internal network and MCPSs 
[8]. 
Real world attacks on MCPS components are increasing 
with the attackers aiming to cause node compromise, 
particularly against Insulin Pumps and Cardiac Devices [4]. 
These attacks can be initiated through over-the-air software 
updates, stack overflow exploits or logic bombs through third 
party developers. It is clear that security is a growing concern, 
particularly for small medical devices attached to a patient [8].  
Remote communication channels, such as those used by 
IMD insulin pumps, can be compromised by an adversary 
within wireless transmission range [2]. This can be achieved 
through a strong antenna or subversion of a networked device. 
In addition, the process can be achieved by being physically 
close to the device, allowing the adversary to inject a 
potentially fatal dose into the patient. For example, 100mg of 
insulin into a patient with normal blood sugar, could induce a 
diabetic coma [2]. 
The most common outcome of a cyber-attack on a 
healthcare-based system, however, is the unavailability of 
patient care due to computer outages. Real world incidents 
have happened with dramatic effects. In one case, a virus in a 
catheterization lab resulted in patients being transferred to 
another hospital [9]. In another instance, a factory-installed 
device arrived at a hospital infected with malware [9].  
Medical devices also experience unexpected interactions 
between devices and systems that have not been triggered 
maliciously [5]. Wireless technologies can suffer from 
interference caused by these devices and make it easier for 
malicious persons to access the network. These devices often 
have no safeguards and are susceptible to buffer overflows 
when unexpected signals are received. Several devices have 
been proven to be affected in this way. Such as, Mechanical 
Ventilators, which have been susceptible to total switch-off and 
change in ventilation rate; Syringe Pumps which have been 
completely stopped; External Pacemakers which have 
malfunctioned and Renal Replacement Devices which have 
also completely stopped [10]. 
Most wearable devices record and collect medical data and 
then transmit to a remote server. This leaves the data 
vulnerable to ‘man in the middle’ attacks [11]. It has been 
considered that security policies should be implemented 
between the wearable devices and the remote server. However, 
this is unsuitable, as it does not protect the patient wherever 
they travel, unless they carry a portable device to perform the 
security policy and communicate with the server about their 
persons at all times [11].  
Mobile devices have unique security challenges; being 
custom built, low-power and resource constrained, which lack 
the processing and security capabilities of a computer [2]. 
Insulin pumps and pacemakers, for example, communicate 
wirelessly with a wearable external monitoring and control unit 
which needs to be accessible to emergency responders and 
medical personnel. It is a challenge, therefore, to implement 
effective key-based encryption techniques due to the 
complexities of key management and revocation, in addition to 
the issues of limited power and heat-dissipation within the 
device [2]. 
There are three key issues with securing updates for 
embedded devices; namely, Untrusted Infrastructures, Sporadic 
Network Connectivity, and Limited Local Resources [12]. 
Embedded devices often do not have user interfaces, meaning a 
user cannot give consent to a software update. In an example 
such as an RFID tag, therefore, they must communicate 
entirely through untrusted readers and infrastructures. With 
regards to sporadic network connectivity, RFID tags and other 
implanted devices can only connect to networks when in range. 
Finally, RFID tags lack the resources for advanced 
cryptographic protocols, they have limited working memory 
and so offload computationally exhaustive operations onto 
RFID readers [12].  
B. Medical Infrastructures 
Figure 1 presents an overview of a typical network 
infrastructure for enabling remote access within the hospital. 
The layout enables staff the ability to work and provide on-call 
services remotely. The blueprint demonstrates where the 
hospitals LANs and VLANs are situated on a hospital network; 
in addition to where the firewalls are placed in relation to the 
Internet. Figure 1 also displays the relationship between the 
hospitals ‘Community of Interest Network’ (CoIN)/WAN and 
the N3 (a WAN used to connect many sites across the NHS). 
 
Figure 1. Remote Access 
The system layout leaves a vulnerability to attackers being 
able to eavesdrop on traffic between the devices; particularly 
the network controller and the supervisor. From there, 
messages can be injected, historian messages can be replayed 
and spoof messages can be generated [5]. In doing so, it is 
possible to compromise the integrity of the device operation 
[5]. If successful, patient privacy would be invaded and 
legitimate data supressed. This compromises patient privacy 
whilst attempting not to interfere with medical device 
operation.  
C. Visualisation Techniques 
Cyber threat monitoring systems detect cyber threats using 
network sensors [13]. They statistically analyse the time of the 
attack, the source of the attack, and the source of the attack, 
and visualize the result. Visualisations are used in order to 
leverage the perceptual abilities of the user in order to find 
features in network structures and data.  
Gephi, for example, is an open source software which is 
used for network exploration, analysis and visualization [14]. It 
uses a 3D render engine which displays large networks in real-
time. This tool is used for the visualisations presented in this 
paper. 
GraphPrism, however, uses a novel visualisation technique 
based on the B-Matrix technique. A two-dimensional matrix is 
employed, where each cell represents the number of nodes 
which can reach k other nodes in l hops, for the analysis of 
large and complex networks [15]. It creates a set of multi-sale 
histograms called ‘facets’ by calculating distributions of 
metrics over neighbourhoods of increasing size. 
IPMatrix is a visualization program that can find trends in 
IP Addresses in order to show patterns to allow administrators 
to predict attacks and prevent them [16]. It is a rudimentary 
visualization of Attacker IP Addresses, allowing the User to 
predict potentially vulnerable addresses at both site-level and at 
local level. 
Divided Edge Bundling is a technique used on node-link 
diagrams [17]. The process reduces clutter and improves 
readability by employing a physical simulation which spatially 
groups graph edges. Divided Edge Bundling takes this 
technique and considers graph topology so that only edges 
related by graph structure are bundled and aggregated edge 
weights in bundles enable more accurate visualisations of total 
bundle weights 
D. Research Aims 
There is a tendency for organisational complacency 
towards the risks of cyber security [18]. Issues of reduced 
information visibility due to data complexity, fragmentation, 
interoperability and lack of specialisation, all undermine the 
security of these organizations [18]. Visualisation techniques 
can be used to provide both awareness and modelling 
capabilities for the benefit of computing in critical 
infrastructures [19]. Organisations need to bridge the gap 
between cyber operations, resilience and the priorities of the 
business. In addition to this, the decision makers need to be 
able to synthesize highly disparate data into a coherent and 
concise narrative [18].  
The goal of security engineers is to develop tools capable of 
detecting malicious, multistage intrusion attacks, weighting the 
individual attacks, and comparing them against the universe of 
attacks within the network [20]. This is a ‘plain recognition 
problem’ and an intruder’s objectives should be determined 
based on the analysis of the entire dataset of attacks, rather than 
just individual attacks [20]. 
There is a lack of consistency between databases which 
store medical device faults, such as FDA Enforcement Reports, 
FDA Medical and Radiation Emitting Device Recalls and the 
Manufacturer and User Facility Device Experience database 
[9]. This is likely due to there being a lack of a meaningful and 
convenient reporting mechanism, in addition to the lack of 
technical cyber expertise of the user of the devices (i.e. 
clinicians). There is also a likelihood that time pressures, lack 
of incentives, absence of federal safe harbour policies and 
inefficient actionable guidance affects the probability of an 
incident being reported [9]. 
In summary, it is clear that information-theoretic control 
systems need to be secured under both passive (such as 
eavesdropping) and active (such as unauthorized data injection) 
security attacks. Protection of information flow within a system 
must include implicit information included in ‘metadata’. This 
can include for example, the timing of cyber transmissions, the 
size of data packets and network protocol traces, in addition to 
explicit information communicated by system users [21]. 
Whilst data encryption and cryptography can protect explicit 
communications, metadata remains vulnerable to cyber-attacks. 
Cryptography and encryption algorithms are limited in their 
ability to hide implicit information leakage. Their 
implementation is also computationally expensive, causing 
delays and increased hardware requirements, which cannot be 
afforded within every cyber link. An important limitation of 
information-theoretic security is the requirement for well-
defined statistical models to be available [21].  
III. SYSTEM DESIGN 
There is a need to address the issue of lack of situational 
awareness on the part of cyber security professionals within 
healthcare infrastructures. In Figure 2 a system is proposed, in 
which medical device data input is visualised in order to be 
analysed and manipulated by the system operator. In this way, 
the data can be assessed for potential points of vulnerability 
within the network. Patterns of behaviour and anomalous data 
can be studied further and addressed. 
The system receives input data directly from the health-care 
network, which it processes and stores until it is called upon by 
the system operator. When the data is requested it is processed 
within the Visualisation Generation Engine and presented to 
the operator through a Graphical User Interface. 
 
Figure 2. System Design Framework 
The components in Figure 2 are explained as follows: 
? Medical Device Input Data: This data is collected and 
transmitted by all or selected medical devices used by 
patients. 
? Data Processing: This component of the framework involves 
processing the medical device input data in order to remove 
irrelevant data from the dataset. The process ensures the data 
is transmitted and stored safely and securely. This stage 
ensures that only pertinent and useful data is analysed. 
? Database: This component stores the data when not in use 
by the other components. In addition to this function, the 
database stores known attack behaviours of datasets to 
compare the input data against. This allows the system to 
identify anomalous and erroneous data within the system in 
order to further investigate potentially malicious activity. 
? Visualisation Generation Engine: This component generates 
the visualisation for the user. The component uses the 
system operators input and calls upon the data stored in the 
database component, which is then processed and visualise 
within the generation engine and passed onto the UI Output. 
? UI Output: This is the output with which the operator 
interacts. The operator can manipulate the visualisation in 
this way and set their own data parameters in order to 
increase their situational awareness of the data flow within 
the healthcare infrastructure.  
IV. EXPERIMENTS 
Building on the system design, the following section presents 
an initial dataset captured from a UK-based hospital network. 
The data is visualised as a demonstration of the research 
approach. 
The data visualised is real-world network data from a 
Liverpool-based hospital network employing over 4,000 staff. 
The data collected is a snapshot of the network infrastructure 
using the network statistics (netstat) command-line in order to 
capture incoming and outgoing Transmission Control Protocol 
(TCP) Data. A sample data and visualisations of netstat 
snapshot data conducted on two servers, is presented in this 
section.  
A. Patient Administration System (PAS) netstat 
Firstly, the network statistics on a server which hosts the 
hospitals Patient Administration System (PAS), as seen in 
Table 1 and Figure 3, is presented. Secondly, a network 
statistics capture on one of the Active Directory Domain 
Controllers at the hospital, as seen in Table 2 and Figure 6, is 
put forward. 
In Table 1 a sample of the netstat data analysed is shown 
displaying firstly, the connection type, secondly the IP source 
connecting to the PAS, thirdly the target of the IP address (the 
PAS server), and fourthly the state of the connection. In Figure 
3 the full dataset is visualised. 
Table 1. Patient Administration System – TCP Socket Connections 
Sample Data (Anonymised) 
Conn Source Target State 
TCP 0.0.0.0:49876 ***SIGAPP05:0 LISTENING 
TCP 10.52.***.224:1
39 
***SIGAPP05:0 LISTENING 
TCP 10.52.***.224:8
19 
4***sophosman01:**881 ESTABLISHED 
TCP 10.52.***.224:8
19 
4***sophosman01:**217 ESTABLISHED 
TCP 10.52.***.224:8
19 
4***sophosman01:**772 ESTABLISHED 
Figure 3 is a visualisation of data connections for the PAS 
system at the Liverpool hospital. The different nodes, depicted 
by blue circles, represent devices accessing the PAS. The 
clusters of nodes represent different servers using the PAS. 
The visualisation shows data connections between each of 
the various servers which compose the PAS solution. This 
includes a server, which hosts the PAS itself, a server which 
hosts SQL databases, and a server which hosts the anti-
malware solution. 
 
Figure 3. Patient Administration System – TCP Socket 
Connections Visualisation 
B. Active Directory Domain Controller (DC) netstat 
Table 2 is a sample of the netstat data analysed is shown. 
Firstly, the connection type is displayed. In addition, secondly 
the IP source connecting to the active directory domain 
controller is presented. Thirdly the target of the IP address, i.e. 
the device name on the domain controller, and fourthly the 
state of the connection are both presented. As before, the full 
dataset is visualised in Figure 6. 
Table 2. Domain Controller – TCP Socket Connections Sample Data 
(Anonymised) 
Conn Source Target State 
TCP 10.52.***.15:135 ***0395:63091 ESTABLISHED 
TCP 10.52.***.15:135 ***0395:63160 ESTABLISHED 
TCP 10.52.***.15:135 ***0645:50562 ESTABLISHED 
TCP 10.52.***.15:135 ***3635:49164 ESTABLISHED 
TCP 10.52.***.15:135 ***3635:49195 ESTABLISHED 
In Figure 4 the most frequent items for Foreign Addresses’ 
on the Domain Controller is shown. The most frequent value is 
that of an asterix as the port has not been established indicating 
that at this time the Domain Controller had approximately 25% 
of its ports connected. 
 
Figure 4. Domain Controller – Frequent Items – Foreign Address 
In Figure 5, however, the output is more varied. The largest 
IP address item counts comprise around 6% of the local IP 
address ports but this number quickly decreases and the 
majority of the ip addresses are unique values. 
 
Figure 5. Domain Controller – Frequent Items – Local Address 
Visualising complex healthcare network to detect anomalous 
behaviour is a significant challenge. This is demonstrated in 
Figure 6, which reveals the complex nature of the networked 
systems. Each of the nodes displays a different device 
connected to the domain controller, such as a physical 
computer or a laptop, or a virtual cloud session. This is further 
exacerbated by the fact that the data presented is merely a 
snapshot of data on one of the domain controllers on the 
hospital network. 
 
Figure 6. Domain Controller – TCP Socket Connections 
Visualisation  
C. Discussion and Future Work 
The visualised data demonstrates how even a small sample 
of the overall data connections within a section of the hospitals 
network infrastructure is difficult to analyse for anomalous data 
behaviours due to sheer quantity of data. Even once the data 
has been visualised, interactions between the user and the 
visualisation itself is a challenge. For this reason, captured 
network data needs to be pre-filtered in order to simplify the 
visualisation and the visualisation process. 
The visualisation will bring together several related data sets 
and present them in such a way as to identify relationships 
between them, using the system design presented in this paper. 
How new data is added to the infrastructure, and when and how 
it moves within it, will be visualised in order to assist end users 
in finding the potential cyber vulnerabilities within the health 
care infrastructure. This will enable end users to be able to 
identify where further cyber security systems need to be put in 
place. In addition, identifying where best practices and policies 
can be implemented to minimize the risk of a cyber-attack on 
highly confidential personal data. The design stage will involve 
testing and modifying various data analysis techniques in order 
to ascertain the most relevant technique for the proposed 
system. Specifically, the data analysis techniques will involve 
using machine learning algorithms to interpret dataset patterns 
and identify potential on-going cyber-attacks. 
V. CONCLUSION 
With healthcare organisations using electronic records, cyber-
based transactions and mobile electronics, the risk of a data 
breach is an increasing concern. Healthcare data is intrinsically 
valuable; the repercussions of data compromise within 
healthcare infrastructures can range from loss of patient 
privacy and fraud to patient injury or potentially death. 
Therefore protecting private patient data and preventing data 
compromise is critically important. Visualisation can be used 
as a tool for cyber security officers within healthcare 
organisations to increase their situational awareness of data 
flow and actively address this issue. Additionally, visualisation 
tools allow system operators to be proactive about cyber 
security within healthcare organisations. This is in contrast to 
the accepted and fundamentally flawed approach of reactivity 
to cyber security attacks, which do not attempt to address the 
underlying security flaws within healthcare organisations. 
In this paper, a framework for data visualisation within 
healthcare infrastructures is proposed. Additionally, two real-
world datasets were analysed and visualised and are presented 
as a study to demonstrate the scale of the research challenge. 
These datasets demonstrate that detecting anomalous data 
behaviours in healthcare infrastructures is challenging. Even 
once data has been visualised it is challenging to manage and 
manipulate in meaningful ways in order to identify irregular 
and anomalous data which may indicate potentially malicious 
behaviour and prevent data compromise. Future work will 
involve the use of date filtering techniques to simplify the 
visualisation of normal network traffic. This will facilitate 
understanding patterns of data behaviours and highlight 
abnormal data behaviours in the network which are the result 
of an attack taking place.  
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